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PROTEST TO PREPARATION
THE VERY DIFFERENT HISTORIES OF COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE
OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS IN PHILADELPHIA’S WAR ON
POVERTY
Eric Augenbraum
IF THERE IS NO STRUGGLE, THERE IS NO PROGRESS. THOSE WHO PROFESS TO
FAVOR FREEDOM, AND YET DEPRECIATE AGITATION, ARE MEN WHO WANT CROPS
WITHOUT PLOWING UP THE GROUND. THEY WANT RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER AND
LIGHTNING. THEY WANT THE OCEAN WITHOUT THE AWFUL ROAR OF ITS MANY WA-
TERS. THIS STRUGGLE MAY BE A MORAL ONE; OR IT MAY BE A PHYSICAL ONE; OR IT
MAY BE BOTH MORAL AND PHYSICAL; BUT IT MUST BE A STRUGGLE. POWER CON-
CEDES NOTHING WITHOUT A DEMAND. IT NEVER DID AND NEVER WILL.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN ADDRESS ON WEST INDIA EMANCIPATION, 1857
***
“Unfortunately manyAmericans live on the outskirts of hope—some be-
cause of their poverty, some because of their color, and all too many because
of both,” said President Lyndon Baines Johnson in his first State of the
Union address in 1964. “…This Administration here and now declares un-
conditional war on poverty inAmerica.”1As one of the centerpieces of Pres-
ident Johnson’s “Great Society” – which sought to combine anti-poverty,
civil rights, and social service policies with a program of liberal economic
development – the War on Poverty was born amid the raging civil rights
struggle, the emerging Black Power movement, and the reality of rampant
urban poverty in the 1960s United States. Operating on the assumption that
the personal deficiencies of poor people (often urban blacks) were respon-
sible for their conditions, it organized a range of job training and education
programs aimed at remedying those deficiencies. One program – the Com-
munity Action Program (CAP) – was slightly different. As a way to give
local communities the authority to devise solutions to poverty tailored to
their specific circumstances, the only requirement of the program was that
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it include the participation of the poor themselves. Despite resting on simi-
lar intellectual foundations as the other War on Poverty programs, it held
within it a radical kernel: it could empower the poor and existing civil rights
organizations to directly challenge urban power structures. In many cities,
this tension led local governments to attempt to control Community Action
from the top down.
In a number of ways, 1960s Philadelphia represents an ideal case
study. One of the country’s largest cities – with a large poor black popula-
tion – Philadelphia was among the first to apply to establish a Community
Action Agency. Yet the program would never be used for its intended pur-
pose, quickly being hijacked by the city’s Democratic machine. Neverthe-
less, owing to the city’s reputation for being a hotbed of civil rights and
Black Power activism in the North and for having a strong local govern-
ment, it provides useful insight into the nature of the conflicts over Com-
munity Action. If Philadelphia’s program typified the failure of the
Community Action, then Leon Sullivan’s Opportunities Industrialization
Centers (OIC), which existed side-by-side with Community Action in the
city, tell a much different story.While CommunityAction was racked by in-
ternal conflict, Sullivan, a renowned Philadelphia clergyman and advocate
of self-help and black capitalism, attainedWar on Poverty funding and grew
his job training program into an international operation.
How are we to understand the vastly different outcomes of these two
“battles” in the War on Poverty? In this essay I will argue that the failure of
Community Action in Philadelphia is primarily attributable to its inherent
contradictions. Namely, the inconsistencies inherent in a program that left
open the possibility of the poor and local activists devising solutions to
poverty that could pose a direct challenge to local authority. For OIC, I con-
tend, the opposite was true. OIC’s political quietism and open acceptance of
notions of poverty as personal defectiveness explain why it was able to en-
dure, and thrive, through the Nixon administration. In telling this story, I
will attempt to paint a broader picture of the city’s black political scene at
the time. Some questions that will be addressed are: Who were the individ-
uals and organizations active during the War on Poverty? What did they
think? What were the relationships of these individuals and groups to each
other and to city government? Finally, in what ways did notions of Black
Power find expression in these two programs?
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MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PARTICIPATION?
OnAugust 20th, 1964 – seven months after his declaration of theWar on
Poverty – President Johnson signed into law the Economic OpportunityAct,
thereby signaling the beginning of the federal government’s commitment to
the largest social welfare program since the New Deal. Shortly after its pas-
sage, Congress approved the allocation of $800 million for the creation of
the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which was principally respon-
sible for the administration of the various War on Poverty programs. John-
son appointed Sargent Shriver – attorney, former director of the Peace Corps,
and brother-in-law of the late President John F. Kennedy – to head the
agency. Among the programs assigned to the OEO’s purview were the Job
Corps, VISTA, Head Start, and the Community Action Program.2
As scholars have shown, a set of assumptions about the sources of
poverty, which emerged out of post-WWII social scientific and psycholog-
ical studies, informed the strategies for combating poverty adopted by gov-
ernment officials and, in turn, gave the above programs their shape. It was
generally understood that poverty was primarily the result of personal defi-
ciencies that led to blocked employment opportunities. Hence, instead of
focusing on the task of job creation and redistribution of wealth, the logic of
job training and education underlaid the War on Poverty as exemplified by
programs like the Job Corps and Head Start. Moreover, the findings of Oscar
Lewis’ influential study, which posited that the impoverished remained
mired in a “culture of poverty,” characterized the thinking of many of the
government officials charged with crafting theWar on Poverty strategy.Ac-
cording to Lewis, the culture of poverty consisted of a set of heritable atti-
tudes and practices of poor people that in turn alienated them from civil
society and rendered them incapable of seizing opportunities to transcend
their conditions. From this perspective, poverty was, in essence, pathologi-
cal. The behavioralist assumptions of the culture of poverty thesis were fur-
ther elaborated and racialized in Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s notorious report
for the Department of Labor, The Negro Family: The Case For National Ac-
tion, released in 1965. For Moynihan, ingrained cultural practices led to the
disintegration of the black nuclear family, which was primarily responsible
for the breakdown of black community structures and, in turn, led to eco-
nomic marginalization. The CommunityAction Program was built on these
intellectual foundations as a remedy for the culture of poverty especially af-
flicting black, primarily urban, populations.3
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Of the many sub-agencies of the OEO the Community Action Pro-
gram was the largest, receiving $300 million of the $800 million set aside by
congress for the War on Poverty.4 Drawing on the programs to combat ju-
venile delinquency developed under the Kennedy administration, CAP en-
couraged the creation of local Community Action Agencies (CAA) to
develop programs for fighting poverty tailored to local realities and apply for
funds from the OEO. Writes one historian, the CAAs had three basic pur-
poses: “to provide new services to the poor; to coordinate all federal, state,
and local program dealing with the poor; and to promote institutional change
in the interests of the poor.”5 Perhaps the most memorable aspect of the CAP,
however, was the requirement that CAAs “be developed and administered
with the maximum feasible participation of the members of the groups and
residents of the areas served.”6 If the poor suffered from a culture of poverty
that left them alienated from mainstream institutions, organizations, and the
mechanisms of public authority, then “maximum feasible participation” was
seen as a vehicle for encouraging the poor to take an active role in improv-
ing their own conditions while inculcating in them a sense of political power
and restoring community. The Community Action Program Guide makes
this clear:
The long-range objective of every community action program is to
effect a permanent increase in the capacity of individuals, groups,
and communities afflicted by poverty to deal effectively with their
own problems so that they need no further assistance. Poverty is a
condition of need, helplessness, and hopelessness. It is rooted in a
network of social ills that include inadequate education, unemploy-
ment, poor health, and dilapidated housing. To alleviate them re-
quires a varied and coordinated attack.7
The precise meaning of “maximum feasible participation,” however, be-
came a point of serious contestation, not just on the local level between city
governments and poor populations, but within the ranks of the federal gov-
ernment itself. For city-dwelling blacks engaged in grassroots political ef-
forts who embraced the nascent mood of
“Black-Power-as-community-control,” CAP was seen as an opportunity to
secure black representation in local political structures and to fashion a pro-
gram for fighting poverty on the terms of the black poor. Thus, the shape
community action took in any given city depended largely upon the relative
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strength of the political forces operating in those cities. For instance, in cities
like Chicago with strong, well-entrenched political machines and relatively
weak black political organizations, local governments maintained near com-
plete control in determining the amount of participation of the poor in CAP.8
In Atlanta, where the business elite was strong and well connected to the
Democratic Party, citizen participation also remained very low. Meanwhile,
in San Francisco the strong local Black Power organizations succeeded for
a time in defining citizen participation in the city’s poverty war.9
The conflict over the meaning of “maximum feasible participation” ul-
timately had the effect of undermining the government’s experiment with
Community Action. In many ways, Philadelphia exemplifies the tensions
present in many cities between local governments and black populations as
well as the tensions within black populations themselves to define the scope
of citizen participation in the struggle over CAP. On one hand, exploring
this tumultuous period in American history from the vantage point of
Philadelphia provides a snapshot of the social, political, and economic issues
that gripped the black population of one of the country’s largest cities. More-
over, it sheds light on the ideas, debates, and actors at play in this particular
city at this particular time. On the other hand, the fight for CAP in Philadel-
phia can speak more generally to the failure of Community Action on a na-
tional level.
***
1960s Philadelphia embodied the postwar Urban Crisis that faced many
of the United States’ large northern cities. Deindustrialization saw a shift
from manufacturing economy – with more stable employment opportuni-
ties – to a primarily service-oriented economy. While many whites were
drawn to the suburbs, Philadelphia’s sizable, largely poor, black population
remained confined to several ghettos across the city. Like many other large
urban centers, de facto segregation characterized the public schools and
other public services. Furthermore, as the civil rights struggle raged in the
South, racial tensions bubbled in Philadelphia. Those racial tensions boiled
over on several notable occasions in the 1960s. Among the most significant
instances were the selective patronage campaign aimed at fighting employ-
ment discrimination, the North Philadelphia race riot of 1964 that arose out
of the friction between community residents and city police, and the 1967
student walkout for better learning conditions and “community control” of
the public schools.10 While Philadelphia exhibited many of the problems of
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other Northern cities in the era of Civil Rights and Black Power, the pres-
ence of strong, well connected black political organizations would factor
significantly into the fight over CAP in the city.
With the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act and the creation
of OEO in the summer of 1964, Philadelphia became one of the first major
cities to throw its hat into the ring for federal funding to create an anti-
poverty program. Likely sensing the potential “maximum feasible partici-
pation” had to unsettle the political balance of power in the city, Mayor
James H.J. Tate – the Irish-American, long-time Democratic politician from
Pennsylvania and mayor of Philadelphia for 10 years – assembled a task
force of local elites and public officials to create and submit to Washington
a proposal for Philadelphia’s anti-poverty plan.11 While the War on Poverty
was welcomed by the city’s black population as a way to improve the con-
ditions of a large portion of the black population, some expressed concern
with the exclusion of both blacks and poor people from the Mayor’s task
force. “The Economic Opportunities [sic] Act has written into it the condi-
tion that there ‘must be citizen participation’ in the local policy making,
planning and administration,” wrote a reader to the Philadelphia Tribune.
“Yet there is only one Negro on the Task Force. There seems to be no indi-
cation that Mr. Tate intends to have any other Negroes anywhere in this top
policy, planning and administrative body.”12 The Citizens Emergency Com-
mittee on theAnti-Poverty Program, formed in February of 1965 as a coali-
tion of seventeen local labor, religious, settlement, neighborhood, and civil
rights groups – including CORE, SNCC, and the NAACP – criticized the
Mayor’s task force and suggested that the federal government reject the
city’s proposal. The OEO agreed and Tate was forced to restructure his plan
to conform to the requirement for citizen participation.13
Tate thus scrapped the task force plan and in the same month sub-
mitted an alternate proposal for the creation of the PhiladelphiaAnti-Poverty
Action Committee (PAAC) – a board of 31 members from the city’s busi-
ness, religious, and civil rights communities including twelve “representa-
tives of the poor” elected directly by the city’s poor population. The first
order of business, however, was selecting someone to head the committee.
Mayor Tate appointed a five-person panel to nominate a candidate to head
PAAC, to be approved by Tate.14As the list of potential candidates narrowed,
the nominating process became increasingly contentious. On one side, the
64-year-old black concert promoter, vice-chairman of PAAC, and close ally
of Mayor Tate, Sam Evans, backed the 34-year-old black attorney Charles
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Bowser. On the other side, Cecil B. Moore, the outspoken president of the
Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP, threw his support behind Isaiah Crip-
pins, another black attorney.When it became clear that Bowser would get the
nod, the dispute between Moore and Evans intensified, with Moore ulti-
mately suggesting that if Bowser was appointed he would withdraw all
NAACP support for PAAC and urge his friend, the renowned Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell Jr. from Harlem, to withhold federal funding from
the program.15
Moore’s support for Crippins and opposition to Bowser rested on
two central claims that are worth exploring in depth, as they reveal much
about both the struggle between city government and local activists to set the
terms of citizen participation in Philadelphia’s anti-poverty program and
basic understandings of black middle class representation of poor blacks’
interests. Moore’s first claim was that the selection of Bowser was politi-
cally motivated. Though Bowser, too, had done legal work for the NAACP,
Crippins’ connections to NAACP leadership made the prospect of his ap-
pointment as chair unattractive to Democratic city officials who wished to
maintain control of PAAC. “Some people want to use the war on poverty
program as a political football,” said Moore. “The benefits to be derived
from the antipoverty program will be drained away from the Negro com-
munity by the politicians.”16 Moore’s claim would certainly be borne out by
subsequent developments – to be discussed below – as Evans was able to
make Community Action function as an arm of the city’s democratic ma-
chine.
Moore’s second claim was a bit more debatable. Crippins, he argued,
was more closely connected to Philadelphia’s black community and thus
better equipped to act on their behalf. Said Moore, Crippins “knows poor
people, and has the backing of the entire Negro community.”17 A closer ex-
amination of the similar personal histories of both Bowser and Crippins,
however, reveals little to distinguish one from the other in this regard. Born
in 1911 in Chattanooga, Tennessee, Isaiah Crippins attended grade school in
Kentucky and was an academic and athletic standout at Knoxville College
where he performed menial tasks to raise the money for his tuition. Before
entering theArmy duringWorldWar II he spent time as a teacher and a per-
sonnel manager for the Tennessee ValleyAuthority and upon his return from
service he enrolled in Yale Law School where he graduated with honors. He
was hired in 1952 by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office where he
worked until 1959 when he went into private practice.
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Charles Bowser, nineteen years Crippins’ junior, was born in North
Philadelphia and attended the city’s public schools. He served in the Army
during the Korean War and later received his law degree from Temple Uni-
versity. As an attorney, Bowser sat on the Police Advisory Board – hearing
citizens’ complaints in cases of police brutality. Both Crippins and Bowser
provided legal council for the Philadelphia NAACP – Crippins representing
the NAACP in its 1963 suit charging the city’s Board of Education with
racial discrimination and Bowser directing a suit in the same year to ban
blackface from the Mummer’s Parade.18 In the absence of any means for the
black population to directly select a candidate to head the PAAC, Moore’s
claims for black middle class representation of the black poor were made
through the language of racial “authenticity.” From this perspective, because
Crippins “knew,” “understood,” and “came from the ranks of” the black poor
he was better suited to operate as their proxy as PAAC chair. This rhetori-
cal strategy was undermined partly by the city’s determination to keep PAAC
tightly within its grasp and partly by the fact that the assertions that Crippins
better represented the community carried little weight given Bowser’s own
North Philadelphia roots.
Despite the protests from Moore, Mayor Tate approved the nomina-
tion of Bowser for the $18,000 per year position as PAAC director in April
of 1965. Meanwhile, after continued threats fromMoore to pull out NAACP
support for PAAC and appeal directly to Washington for War on Poverty
funds, Crippins accepted a $15,000 per year position as general legal advi-
sor to PAAC.As executive director, Bowser’s responsibilities included being
the primary spokesman for the city’s program and coordinating projects be-
tween local communities and organizations, federal agencies, and PAAC.
Crippins, according to Tate, was to “accompany Bowser to all meetings with
federal and state antipoverty program administrators” and to “assist the ex-
ecutive director in negotiating the terms and provisions of all contracts under
antipoverty programs.” Though still concerned that the appointment of
Bowser as director was an attempt by the city government to wrest control
of PAAC from the poor, the clarification of Crippins’ duties convinced
Moore that Crippins could “be an effective watchdog.”19
Bowser’s first assignment as executive director was to organize and im-
plement the second major feature of Mayor Tate’s revised anti-poverty plan
– the creation of local CommunityAction Councils and the selection of “rep-
resentatives of the poor” to sit on PAAC. “I believe that the solution to
poverty must come from the poor people themselves,” said Bowser, ex-
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pressing the logic that undergirded the innovation of community action as
an anti-poverty strategy. “I believe very deeply that the poor can handle and
deal with their own problems.”20 The practical application of Bowser’s be-
lief in self-help would be the creation of twelve, twelve-person Community
Action Councils (CAC) – one located in each of twelve predetermined
“pockets of poverty” composed of the highest concentration of the city’s
poor. Each CAC would then select one “representative of the poor” to sit on
PAAC. Of the major cities to apply for OEO funding, Philadelphia was the
first to employ direct elections for representatives in its Community Action
program. This would prove to be a massive undertaking, requiring signifi-
cant preparation and clarification. The election process would also bring to
the fore the underlying tensions between politicians, the poor, and local or-
ganizations active in predominantly poor areas over the character of Com-
munity Action in the city.21
With elections scheduled for the late spring of 1965, PAAC called for a
series of informational town hall meetings to be held in each of the twelve
pockets of poverty to provide details about Community Action and field
questions about the program from members of the city’s poor population.
Held on the night of April 28th, 1965, the first meetings drew nearly 9,000
of Philadelphia’s poorest residents. Before mostly packed, sometimes rowdy,
school auditoriums, local War on Poverty administrators answered a range
of questions about the program, centering primarily on eligibility require-
ments and procedural issues. The most contentious matter was the income
requirement. To qualify for election, single or married residents could make
no more than $3,000 annually – adding $500 to the cap for each dependent.
This raised concerns that the representatives of the poor would be limited in
their ability to influence PAAC: “It is ridiculous to think that a person with
that kind of income is going to be able to make himself heard in the com-
pany of government officials and trained social workers,” said one woman.
Candidates and voters were required to reside in the designated pocket of
poverty that they sought to represent and in which they wished to vote. Fi-
nally, voters were to cast their ballots for each of the twelve seats of their
local CACs. Local officials viewed the meetings as successful, and the one-
month dash to election day was underway.22
Within a month of the first town hall meetings, 361 people had filed for
candidacy for the 144 available CAC seats.As the election approached, how-
ever, city government began to feel uneasy. Owing to the twelve-person bal-
lot format, local organizations active in Philadelphia’s black neighborhoods
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assembled and campaigned on the basis of twelve-candidate slates. For
neighborhood activists, slates were a logical way to attain a voice in the local
War on Poverty and hinder city government’s efforts to circumvent already
established neighborhood organizations. “Organizing a slate is democracy at
the highest level,” said Alvin Echols, director of the North City Congress –
the prominent coalition of North Philadelphia neighborhood groups. “It is
the only way that you can make sure that the best job possible will be done
for your neighborhoods.”23 Meanwhile, city politicians grew uneasy. For
some, slates threatened to politicize the War on Poverty and create an in-
surgent class of grassroots neighborhood activists that would challenge the
authority of local elected officials and initiate a power struggle in the halls
of city government. “There is real danger that local people who are very ar-
ticulate power seekers may organize this election,” said Dr. Julian L. Greifer.
“Sending these leaders to PAAC would result in a struggle for power and
jealousy that would injure the war on poverty.”24 The concerns of Tate ad-
ministration officials, on the other hand, were far more immediate: the elec-
tion of full slates of neighborhood activists to CACs would make it more
difficult for City Hall to dictate the direction of the War on Poverty. Thus,
anti-poverty officials encouraged citizens to vote for individuals as opposed
to slates. “It is certainly unfair,” stated one spokesman, “to select twelve
people to represent an entire area, when some areas will have as many as 46
people on the ballot.”25 Though city government was primarily interested in
maintaining control of the anti-poverty program, urging a vote for individ-
uals could also have been construed as indicative of a commitment to full cit-
izen participation.
With FederalWar on Poverty officials observing from afar, voting began
at 9 AM on May 26th. A successful election could very well establish
Philadelphia’s CommunityAction Program as the blueprint for future cities.
While reports indicated that as many as 500,000 Philadelphians were eligi-
ble to vote, only 13,500 had cast ballots when the polls closed at 9 PM. De-
spite the light turnout, PAAC executive director Charles Bowser was
optimistic: “To get more than 13,000 people in an election of this type, with
amateurs running and no party loyalty at stake is just thrilling.”26 In several
North andWest Philadelphia districts, twelve-person slates – most backed by
the North City Congress – were, in fact, able to win control of CACs. Gen-
erally speaking, heavily black districts displayed larger turnouts than ma-
jority white sections of the city. In sum, 91 women – 35 of them housewives
– and 53 men were elected to the 144 non-paying positions.27 Two weeks
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later, the recently elected CACs convened to select from their ranks twelve
representatives to sit on PAAC. The gender balance of those selected re-
flected the composition of the 144 CAC representatives – 9 women and 3
men.28
It is worth discussing, briefly, the backgrounds of some of the represen-
tatives of the poor as it can provide a glimpse into the range of issues that
faced the city’s poor and the diversity of their experiences. Perhaps the best
known and most well respected of the twelve representatives was the long-
time North Philadelphia resident and mother of 10, Clara Baldwin. Born in
Delaware, Baldwin attended Dover State College prior to moving to
Philadelphia in 1937. Belying her classification as “poor” by federal stan-
dards was an extensive involvement in community affairs – Baldwin was
an active member of a number of local women’s and uplift organizations.
Dedicated to the ethic of self-help and education that characterized the strat-
egy of the War on Poverty, she purchased a house in 1958 and opened the
Clara Baldwin Community Center from which she ran recreational and ed-
ucational programs for children. In 1964 she received a grant to construct the
Clara Baldwin Neighborhood House, which served as a community center
and hub for various job training and educational programs. Finally, she was
active in local politics, running unsuccessfully for a seat in the state General
Assembly in 1964 as a Republican.At age 55, she was one of the oldest rep-
resentatives of the poor.29
On the other hand, the 22-year-old Allison Bryant was the youngest
member of the council. Amaster’s student at Temple University, he led chil-
dren’s recreational programs to finance his education. In addition, several
single mothers sat on PAAC, including 27-year-old mother of three, Chris-
tine Allen, and 39-year-old mother of five, Viola Pankey. While Allen was
unemployed and not affiliated with any community organizations, Pankey
held positions in five different organizations. Other women on the council
included the self-employed candy maker, Mayme James, and Ida Mae
Watkins, a grandmother from the city’s Germantown section active in sev-
eral local civic organizations. Yet, no member of the PAAC better exempli-
fied the inherent contradictions of Community Action in Philadelphia than
Samuel Yarborough. Despite expressing prescient concerns about jobs being
dangled by anti-poverty officials in exchange for support for the political
machine, the 46-year-old, unemployed, high school dropout would himself
become embroiled in a controversy after accepting a $9,000 per year job
working on PAAC staff. 30 As will be discussed below, Yarborough is but
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one example of the ultimately successful attempt by the city’s Democratic
machine to effectively neuter Community Action in Philadelphia.
Federal officials and the OEO initially expressed optimism at the smooth,
if sparsely attended, election and the creation of PAAC and it was not long
until federal funds began rolling in – nearly six million dollars – for a hand-
ful of children’s educational programs and adult job training programs. If the
OEO’s intention was for CACs to create and operate new anti-poverty pro-
grams in response to local needs, Philadelphia’sWar on Poverty quickly de-
viated from this model. By the middle of 1966, Charles Bowser and Sam
Evans came under the harsh scrutiny of local activists for muzzling the voice
of the representatives of the poor on PAAC and in the CACs. “The empha-
sis seems to be on control rather than liberation of people in poverty areas,”
said Norval Reece of Americans for Democratic Action. “We were elected
as stooges,” charged CAC member Eulalia Horan. “The program is politi-
cally controlled from city hall.”31 As foreshadowed by Mayor Tate’s initial
anti-poverty task force proposal, the battle between Bowser and Crippins
for the position of director of PAAC, and the attempts by city government
to limit slate voting in the anti-poverty election, Sam Evans, abetted by
Bowser, took steps to eliminate citizens participation from the city’s anti-
poverty program once and for all.
Local activists, CAC members, and the OEO alike accused Evans of
transforming Community Action into a political patronage program for the
city’s Democratic Party. By the summer of 1966, the OEO found that as
many as 118 CACmembers and 142 of their relatives were employed in the
anti-poverty program or city government. By dangling such jobs in exchange
for votes of the representatives of the poor on PAAC and in CACs as well
as offering OEO funds to already existing welfare agencies sitting on PAAC,
Evans and Bowser were able to move the program in precisely the direction
they wanted.As a result, local CACs atrophied. Instead of performing the in-
tended task of involving the poor in finding solutions for poverty, the
Philadelphia poor were “virtually unaware of PAAC,” according to a gov-
ernment official. One North Philadelphia CAC could conduct business only
four times in 18 meetings owing to a lack of quorum. OEOmoved to impose
restrictions on Evans’ patronage enterprise by forcing those who were both
employed by the city and CACmembers to resign from one of the two posts.
Evans expressed outrage at the federal constraints, stating: “We in Philadel-
phia feel we have enough knowledge of the community to get the best results
for the money spent.” Moreover, after offering only $40,000 in funds for the
Protest to Preparation86
1966 CAC election, another low turnout, and similarly paltry results in other
cities, OEO terminated direct elections of Community Action representa-
tives. Finally, in a last ditch effort to revitalize Philadelphia CACs in 1967,
the OEO withheld funding until Isaiah Crippins’ position was slashed –
prompting Bowser to resign as director. Coinciding with the OEO’s effec-
tive abandonment of CAP in late 1967 thanks to similar difficulties in other
cities, PAAC faded in relevance – receiving less and less federal money – de-
spite Evans operating it as a patronage program until the eventual collapse
of the War on Poverty.32
The Black Power ideals of community control and grassroots solutions
to poverty could not coexist with the reality of urban political machines, like
that in Philadelphia, committed to maintaining power.As we have seen, this
contradiction reared its ugly head at every stage during Philadelphia’s ex-
periment with Community Action. In reality, this was a contradiction that
was written into the very fabric of CAP by War on Poverty strategists: a
piece of public policy specifically designed to bypass traditional avenues
for the implementation of public policy – namely local governments and
agencies. Instead it was to be implemented by the very people who them-
selves lived in poverty. The Tate administration would not sit idly while
Washington underwrote a social movement that could threaten the author-
ity of city government. Again, the shape “maximum feasible participation”
took in any given city depended largely upon the specificities of that city. But
in places like Philadelphia with strong, well-organized political machines,
genuine citizen participation was very much stillborn. As we will see, how-
ever, where the shared Black Power andWar on Poverty sensibility of com-
munity control of anti-poverty programs failed to harmonize with the
interests of local government in Philadelphia, another program connected
to the War on Poverty in Philadelphia that also embraced a strain of Black
Power ideology succeeded with flying colors.
TUSKEGEE IN PHILADELPHIA
The prominence of education and job training programs in the War on
Poverty flowed from what had become common sense assumptions, backed
by social science of the day, about the roots of poverty in the post-WWII
period. If, as this common sense held, personal defects and a “culture of
poverty” left the poor unqualified and unprepared for employment, then it
followed that education for children and job training for adults could begin
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to correct the problems of unemployment and poverty. This narrative
avoided a critique of structural inequality andAmerican capitalism rooted in
political economy and instead defined poverty as a form of individual pathol-
ogy – it was not the creation of jobs that was necessary, it was the creation
of individuals fit to fill them. Moreover, the commitment to job training fit
agreeably with the program of “Growth Liberalism” to which the Johnson
administration was wedded. Likely adding to the political expedience of the
issue was the fact that an anti-poverty program focused on education and
job training was relatively inexpensive.33
In this ideological climate and in the context of the Civil Rights and
Black Power eras, the OEO’s dedication to such a formula found an ana-
logue in a particularly conservative strain of Black Power ideology where
notions of self-help and black entrepreneurship were connected to a project
of racial uplift. In Philadelphia, the most visible proponent of this sensibil-
ity was the Reverend Leon Sullivan with his Opportunities Industrialization
Centers (OIC). Starting as a local adult job training program, OIC would re-
ceive significant War on Poverty funding and go on to outlive the War on
Poverty itself – growing into an international organization. Existing side-
by-side in Philadelphia with the CommunityAction Program – viewed as an
abject failure – OIC flourished. Despite studies suggesting only a tenuous
link, at most, between education and earning power, the logic of job train-
ing has endured into the present.34 So too, did OIC. What can the early his-
tory of this organization tell us about the reasons for its long-term survival?
***
Leon Sullivan came to Philadelphia in 1950 after spending several years
as a pastor in New Jersey and as Rev.Adam Clayton Powell Jr.’s understudy
at the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem. Born in Charleston, West Vir-
ginia in 1922, the six foot, five inch Sullivan attended the historically black
West Virginia State College on a basketball scholarship. Growing up under
Jim Crow, he described the experience of being denied seating after order-
ing a soda in a local store as a formative event in his childhood. At that mo-
ment “…I decided…that I was going to stand up against that kind of thing
the rest of my life,” he said. Upon his arrival in Philadelphia to lead the Zion
Baptist Church, the charismatic pastor involved himself in community af-
fairs and quickly earned the reputation as a champion of civil rights. Pref-
acing Sullivan’s development of OIC was his involvement on the front lines
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of the city’s selective patronage movement in the early 1960s. Sullivan
brought together a coalition of black clergy and organized members of the
black population in a campaign targeting local businesses that discriminated
against blacks in their hiring practices. While the boycotts were successful
in winning agreements from businesses to hire blacks and Sullivan’s cen-
trality in the campaign further cemented his image as a stalwart of civil
rights, the failure of blacks to fill many of the recently opened positions and
the persistence of unemployment in Philadelphia’s ghettos sent him looking
for new solutions to the problems faced by poor black Philadelphians.35
By the summer of 1963 – nearly two years before the start of the
War on Poverty – Sullivan had found his solution. During a meeting at the
Zion Baptist Church, he announced his plan to establish the Opportunities
Industrialization Center – one of the first black-run job training programs of
its kind. Though the selective patronage movement had been successful, he
argued, blacks in Philadelphia still faced the problem of being underskilled
for many of the new positions that were opening up. Training was required
to provide them with the skills necessary for employment. Further, by en-
couraging black business and entrepreneurship, he saw OIC as a step to-
wards uplifting the black population and bridging the racial disparity in
wealth. Sullivan’s intention was to fund the program through foundation
grants and federal money, and he cast his gaze on an abandoned police sta-
tion on the corner of 19th and Oxford streets in North Philadelphia as the
program’s first training center. Quickly, support for OIC among city gov-
ernment, the business community, and the black population began to build.
Corporations began to donate money and machinery to the program and the
city agreed to lease the abandoned police station to the program for one dol-
lar per year. Interest in the program had grown so high that by the time the
center was set to open in January of 1964, some 1,000 Philadelphians – ten
percent of them white – had applied to participate. “It is our intention to
prove that genius is color blind,” said Sullivan, “and to indicate to the nation
that in the future, Negroes intend to help themselves.” OIC received the
Presidential seal of approval at its opening gala on January 26th – two weeks
after Johnson declared “unconditional war on poverty.”At the packed event
attended by almost 9,000 supporters, a telegram from Johnson sent greetings
and cited OIC as representing the vanguard in the War on Poverty.36
Classes got underway at OIC in early March. In many ways, OIC’s
program resembled typical job training and industrial education programs,
with students receiving basic education in a trade of their choice, graduat-
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ing when they became employed. In other ways, however, it reflected Leon
Sullivan’s commitment to racial uplift, self-reliance, and black capitalism.
It also illustrated his belief in poverty as primarily the result of personal de-
ficiencies and highlighted the points at which this interpretation coincided
with mainstream ideological currents. The “feeder program,” for instance,
launched in September, 1964, was designed for OIC applicants believed to
be in need of more comprehensive training. In this program, students were
taught the basics – reading, writing, and mathematics – as well as speech,
grooming, and dress. If poverty was understood as at least partly ingrained
in the behavioral patterns of the poor, then correcting these patterns was a
legitimate anti-poverty strategy. Finally, the feeder program emphasized
black history. Sullivan’s explanation betrayed a quasi-nationalist sensibility
typical of the Black Power era: “You have been brainwashed for more than
100 years into believing you are inferior. We are going to wipe that brain-
washing away.” To Sullivan, then, the evaporation of race pride and self-re-
spect in city-dwelling poor black people was responsible for their pathology
– learning their own history would, in turn, restore pride and self respect by
reminding them of their capabilities. Perhaps what most endeared OIC to
the business community and politicians – state and federal – was its explicit
eschewal of politics at a time when black protest was at its very apogee. For
Sullivan, the problems with the black population and the solution to those
problems lied within.37
Over the next few years, a torrent of funds from a variety of sources
inundated OIC. The steady stream of corporate donations – both money and
equipment – was punctuated in 1964 by a $200,000 Ford Foundation grant.
That same year, Sullivan received the first significant federal funding for
OIC when the Department of Labor granted the program $458,000 – fore-
shadowing the large OEO grant that would soon follow. Corporate and gov-
ernment donations were not the only sources of funds, though.Also in 1964,
Sullivan launched the “Month of Opportunities Drive” to raise funds locally.
1,000 female OIC supporters were put in charge of the drive and the goal
was set at raising $100,000. By the end of the month, the goal had been sur-
passed and more than half of the money raised came from the donations of
local blacks. With a solid base of financial support thus in place, OIC was
set to expand. And thanks to a Bucks County farmer, in December, expand
OIC did. The anonymous farmer gave Sullivan the use of a seven story
building in West Philadelphia for a second OIC location at a yearly rent of
“[o]ne slice of black bread and one cup of black coffee (without sugar)…”38
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When it was clear that Philadelphia would adopt the CommunityAc-
tion Program in late 1964, Sullivan moved quickly to secureWar on Poverty
funding for OIC. After being included in Tate’s rejected proposal to the
OEO, upon the creation of PAAC and the election of CACs, OIC finally re-
ceived $1,756,163 of the six million dollars in federal money allotted to
Philadelphia’s War on Poverty. This allowed Sullivan to open a third OIC
branch in South Philadelphia. From here, OIC and PAAC took quite diver-
gent paths. While turmoil struck PAAC and Community Action became lit-
tle more than a front for the city’s Democratic machine, at the same time,
OIC enjoyed only resounding success. Groups of fact-finders seeking to
replicate OIC in cities across the country toured Philadelphia’s four branches
regularly, and almost all were quick to praise the program. “It is really most
impressive,” said one visitor. “This is the best program of this type that I’ve
seen or heard of in the country.” A group from New York City was equally
impressed: “We came to Philadelphia to see OIC for ourselves. We heard it
was working.And we are glad we came,” they said. By the summer of 1966,
eight new programs were set to open in cities ranging from Oakland to
Washington D.C.39
The federal government, too, was quick to get behind Sullivan’s proj-
ect. During his visit to Philadelphia that same winter, Robert Kennedy
praised OIC while defending the War on Poverty: “This is not a substitute
for the poverty program,” he said, “It does not answer all of the problems of
the big cities. However, it is doing one of the most important jobs in the
poverty program, providing job opportunities for the unemployed.” Less
than a week later, Sullivan appeared before a Senate subcommittee to re-
quest $100 million for OIC branches in 65 other cities, comparing the cost
of 20 jets being used for the war in Vietnam. That such a request was even
possible reflects the bi-partisan consensus that job training had become a
common sense anti-poverty strategy. OIC continued to grow through the 60s
and, by 1968, Sullivan boasted of branches in 75 cities nationwide. Then, in
1970, when the War on Poverty was on its last legs, the Senate voted 68 to
6 to include OIC in the federal budget with the Employment TrainingAct.40
In just seven years, Leon Sullivan’s “grassroots job training program” had
gone from an abandoned police station in North Philadelphia into the fed-
eral budget.
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CONCLUSION
In 1973, President Richard Nixon eliminated the Office of Economic
Opportunity, effectively ending the War on Poverty. While President John-
son’s attempt to eliminate poverty in the United States certainly fell short of
that goal, its results were, in fact, mixed. The same cannot be said for per-
haps the most controversial element of theWar on Poverty: the Community
Action Program – viewed almost universally as an utter failure. Philadel-
phia was no exception. If “maximum feasible participation” of the poor was
the primary stipulation of CAP, then Philadelphia’s anti-poverty program
proceeded in brazen defiance of the rules. OIC, on the other hand – born at
the same historical moment and in the same political context as CAP in
Philadelphia – did not die when the War on Poverty ended. In fact, it en-
joyed sustained growth during Nixon’s presidency, due, in part, to Leon Sul-
livan’s support for Nixon. Nowhere were the conservative implications of
Sullivan’s brand of Black Power more apparent than in his endorsement of
the right-wing president: “Don’t underestimate Richard Nixon,” he said. “In
terms of black enterprise, he did more than any president.”41
How, then, do we account for the vastly different legacies of these two
contemporaneous programs? The answer may be as simple as one word:
politics. While both were informed by similar notions about the roots of
poverty and the ways to overcome it and both appealed to proponents of
strains of the emergent mood of Black Power, CAP failed because it was
unavoidably political. As illustrated by the history of PAAC, local politi-
cians and elites would not relinquish control of a program that had the po-
tential to give federal backing to the social movements of the 1960s. By
comparison, OIC was explicit in its abstention from politics. During his visit
to Philadelphia in 1967, President Johnson praised this approach: “The
movement has moved from protest to preparation, unleashing the power
which was there but which had been obscured.” 42 Of course, what John-
son’s formulation overlooked was the fact that the success of every social
movement in history has been, in part, dependent on the ability of those
movements to protest effectively. This was an observation that Frederick
Douglass made more than a hundred years before with his now famous dic-
tum: “If there is no struggle, there is no progress.”
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